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 OIL AND GAS 
Upstream 
Ctr. For Envtl. Law and Policy v. State Dep’t of Ecology, 468 P.3d 1064 
(Wash. 2020). 
The Respondents, Center for Environmental Law and Policy (“Center”), 
brought suit against Petitioners, Department of Ecology (“Ecology”), to 
challenge the validity of Ecology’s summer minimum instream flow rate 
rule, alleging Ecology exceeded its authority with an arbitrary and 
capricious rule and failed to fulfill its public trust responsibilities, and then 
moved to supplement the record. The trial court denied the motion to 
supplement and dismissed the challenge to Ecology’s rule validity. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed rejection of the motion the supplement and the 
public trust argument but invalidated the rule, holding Ecology had 
exceeded its authority. Ecology appealed to the Washington Supreme 
Court. The court asserted the Washington Administrative Procedure Act 
places the burden of asserting an administrative rule’s invalidity on the 
challenger. Subject to de novo review, the rule may only be invalidated if it 
is (1) unconstitutional, (2) is outside the statutory authority of the agency, 
(3) is arbitrary of capricious, or (4) was adopted without complying with 
statutory rule making procedures. Center asserted the rule was arbitrary and 
capricious; they argued Ecology failed to consider statutory recreational, 
navigational, and aesthetic values when setting the rule. The court held the 
challenge fails under the plain language of the statute in question because 
the record shows Ecology did consider those values–and in fact set a rate 
that sustains recreation and navigation–but even if they did not, the statute 
only provides guidelines and not required elements. The court held that 
Center failed to meet its burden showing Ecology exceeded its authority by 
setting an arbitrary and capricious rule and thus reversed the Court of 
Appeals invalidation of Ecology’s rule. 
Slawson Expl. Co., v. Nine Point Energy, LLC, 966 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 
2020). 
Exploration Company and Production Company entered into an 
exploration and development agreement (EDA) to drill and develop in an 
area of North Dakota. Included in the EDA was a Promote Obligation to 
pay an additional 10% of Production Company’s costs in electing to drill. 
Production Company later filed for bankruptcy. Exploration Company filed 
for a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding claiming the Promote 
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Obligation was not subject to discharge. The bankruptcy court allowed 
Exploration Company to commence litigation on the issue. Exploration 
Company filed a declaratory action against Production Company claiming 
the Promote Obligation (1) is a covenant that runs with the land, (2) an 
equitable servitude, or (3) is a real property interest. The district court 
granted Production Company’s motion for summary judgment. Exploration 
Company failed to demonstrate that the Promote Obligation ran with the 
land. Covenants that run with the land must directly benefit the land, and 
because the Promote Obligation is a cost that personally benefits the 
Exploration Company and the cost was not directly tied back into 
benefiting the land, it, therefore, did not directly benefit the land. Second, 
Exploration Company contended the Promote Obligation was an equitable 
servitude, because it had many similarities of an easement by estoppel. An 
equitable servitude and an easement by estoppel have similar characteristics 
but had different elements a Promote Obligation could not satisfy. Third, 
Exploration Company contended that an overriding royalty interest, 
recognized as a real property interest, and a Promote Obligation are the 
same except for different payment periods. The Ninth Circuit held royalties 
operate as profits issuing out of the land. Because drilling was not 
necessarily profiting out of the land, it could not be considered a real 
property interest. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district 
court. 
Downstream 
Total E&P USA, Inc. v. Marubeni Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., No. 19-20271, 
2020 WL 4460002 (5th Cir. Jul. 31, 2020). 
Operator-1 filed three lawsuits seeking declaratory judgment against 
Operator-2 after the bankruptcy court deemed Operator-1 liable for 
Operator-3’s abandonment costs associated with three interrelated assets, a 
pipeline, and two oil and gas fields. During bankruptcy court proceedings, 
Operator-3’s creditors pledged proceeds from one half of the overriding 
royalty interest to Operator-2, reducing Operator-3’s abandonment liability. 
Before filing, Operator-1 assigned interest in all assets to Operator-3. 
Operator-2 removed all cases to federal court. Parties cross-motioned for 
summary judgment on liability for two out of three cases. The third case is 
pending in district court. On summary judgment, Operator-1 asserted the 
assignment of interest to Operator-3 relieved Operator-1’s liability for 
abandonment costs. Both trial courts found Operator-1 jointly and severally 
liable and granted partial summary judgment for Operator-2. The trial 
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courts both entered judgment for Operator-2, awarding Operator-2 damages 
subtracted by the value of the royalty interest. Operator-2 motioned for 
judgment as a matter of law and to alter the judgment related to the royalty 
interest. The court denied Operator-2’s combined motion. Both parties 
appealed, and Operator-1 motioned for consolidation of appeals. On appeal, 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated both appeals and looked to 
both assets’ operating agreements. The court reversed the trial court’s 
judgment for Operator-2 on case one, holding that the operating agreement 
contained an express provision that relieved Operator-1’s liability. 
Conversely, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for Operator-2 on 
case two, holding absent an express provision, like one in case one, 
Operator-1 remained liable for Operator-3’s abandonment costs. Further, 
the court affirmed the denial of Operator-2’s motion, allowing a royalty 
interest setoff to Operator-1’s liability. This is an unpublished opinion of 
the court; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the 
case as precedent. 
Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 969 F.3d 502, 2020 WL 
4582196 (5th Cir. 2020). 
In 2013, several Louisiana Parishes (“Parishes”) sued several Oil and 
Gas Companies (“Companies”) seeking relief under the Louisiana State and 
Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (“SLCRMA”). 
SLCRMA required anyone who wished to start using Louisiana’s coastal 
zone for any activity significantly impacting coastal waters to apply for a 
permit. However, SLCRMA’s grandfather clause did not require anyone 
already legally using the coastal zone, prior to SLCRMA’s enactment, to 
have a permit. Parishes alleged Companies continued use of coastal zone 
canals and wells, built prior to SLCRMA, violates SLCRMA and the 
grandfather clause did not apply. 
Companies initially tried to remove the case; however, the district courts 
denied their motion. After Parishes expert report, Companies tried to 
remove the case for a second time. This time, Companies claimed first 
notice of federal question jurisdiction as Parishes’ expert report indicated 
Parishes sued Companies for use of wells and canals built during World 
War II when Companies were under a federal wartime agency, the 
Petroleum Administration for War. Parishes moved to remand. 
The Eastern and Western Districts of Louisiana granted Parishes’ motion 
to remand. Companies appealed the remand. The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the remand because Companies filed notice of removal 
too late. The court held Companies’ first notice of a federal question did not 
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come from Parishes’ expert report. Initial notice came from a previous 
report filed by Parishes with the court long before initiation of this suit and 
Parishes’ expert report merely repeated that same information about the 
wells violating SLCRMA. The court affirmed the remand motions. 
Cline v. Sunoco, Inc. (R&M), et al., No. CIV-17-313-JAG, 2020 WL 
4748026 (E.D. Okla. August 17, 2020). 
A class of Royalty Owners sought compensatory and punitive damages 
against Fuel Distributor for unpaid interest accrued on late royalty 
payments. Royalty Owners sued under theories of breach of statutory 
obligation to pay interest and fraud. Fuel Distributor disputed class 
certification based upon an inability to identify an accurate list of affected 
Royalty Owners and Royalty Owners’ individual damages. The class was 
maintained because Royalty Owners’ expert witness sufficiently 
determined the members of the class and their respective interest owed. 
Trial court found that Fuel Distributor’s expert witness’s untimely 
completion of their report sufficiently burdened Royalty Owners’ expert 
witness and warranted striking Fuel Distributor’s expert witness’s 
testimony. Trial court also found that Fuel Distributor breached their 
statutory obligation to pay interest by routinely withholding interest owed 
under Oklahoma’s Production Revenue Standards Act (“PRSA”) unless it 
was requested by Royalty Owner. Interest begins to accrue and compound 
at the default rate of 12% upon the date the royalty payment is due. Fuel 
Distributor contended that they were only subject to the 6% rate applicable 
in circumstances where title to royalties is not marketable. Trial court 
rejected this argument because marketability is irrelevant once Fuel 
Distributor has made an initial payment. Fuel Distributor further argued that 
Royalty Owners with unclaimed payments should be excluded. Trial court 
rejected this argument because paying the state the unclaimed funds 
amounts to paying a third party on behalf of the Royalty Owner. Trial court 
rejected Royalty Owners’ fraud claim because they failed to show reliance 
upon the information contained within Fuel Distributor’s payments. Trial 
court awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. Punitive damages 
were warranted under both the Energy Litigation Reform Act (“ELRA”) 
and Oklahoma’s punitive damages statute because of Fuel Distributor’s 
intentional unwillingness to pay the statutorily required interest. 
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Schmucker v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-1593 JD, 2020 WL 
4593867 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2020) 
A manufacturing facility contaminated the soil, groundwater, and indoor 
air of a nearby residential neighborhood. The company operating the 
manufacturing facility connected the exposed houses to the city waterline 
and installed vapor mitigation systems when it became aware of the 
contamination. Residents of the neighborhood brought suit against the 
manufacturing facility claiming the company was in violation of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and that the contamination could 
endanger their environment and health. The Northern District Court of 
Indiana had previously ruled on the violation claim, granting summary 
judgement and turned to the endangerment claim at bench trial. The only 
disputed element of the endangerment claim was whether imminent and 
substantial endangerment was present to health or environment. The 
residents claimed that the groundwater contamination will present a danger 
through different routes of exposure to the city wellfield, private wells, 
water pipes, and a general threat to the environment. The court found there 
was no imminent or substantial endangerment to any of the avenues of 
groundwater, through the evidence presented by the residents. The residents 
also asserted an endangerment threat of vapor intrusion. The court found 
that the vapor mitigation systems the company had installed in every 
structure that exceeded the appropriate indoor air screening levels have 
been successful in preventing any endangerment. “An endangerment claim 
‘was designed to provide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the 
risk of future “imminent” harms[]’” and the mitigation systems had already 
accomplished this. The unmitigated structures and houses, and preferential 
pathways, presented no serious health risk through vapor intrusion. 
Arconic, Inc. v. Alcoa, Inc., No. 19-55181, 2020 WL 4579511 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 10, 2020). 
A refrigerants and solvents recycling company contaminated nearby soil 
and ground water, and customers of this company were held responsible for 
the cost of the clean-up process. Under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), the group of 
customers had three years to seek contribution for the cost of the 
contamination from other entities that contributed to the contamination 
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through owning property and operating businesses near the facility. These 
parties settled with the group, and the group assumed the parties’ 
responsibilities for the site. Years later, the EPA learned of other 
contaminations by this company from another facility and this group of 
customers brought another suit against the same de minimis parties. The de 
minimis parties claimed that the earlier settlement triggered the Act’s three-
year statute of limitations for contribution claims under a judiciary 
approved settlement. The group of customers appealed after the District 
Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in 
favor of the de minimis parties. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the 
customer’s claims are not untimely because the first settlement can not be 
characterized as covering the costs of the second clean up even if it the 
remediation of the second clean-up was foreseen in the first suit. Under the 
Act, the limitation period of a settlement is only for the response cost 
imposed as a basis for seeking contribution. A statute of limitations may not 
run or expire before a party has an opportunity to assert the claim, therefor 
the limitation period of the Act starts upon the entry of a settlement 
imposing a specific liability, not before. 
This case focused on the procedural aspect of the statute of limitations 
for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act. 
MPM Silicones, LLC., v. Union Carbide Corp., 966 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 
2020). 
Subsequent Owner sued Original Owner under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) 
for reimbursement of money spent removing pollutants and future costs 
associated with cleaning up pollutants. The district court held that the 
recovery for remedial actions was barred by the statute of limitations and 
entered a declaratory judgment that the Original Owner was responsible for 
95% of future removal expenses. Both parties appealed. To determine the 
statute of limitations under CERCLA, a party’s efforts to remove pollutants 
are classified as remediations or removals. Remedial actions are permanent 
remedies, whereas removal actions are defined as the “cleanup or removal 
of released hazardous substances from the environment.” On appeal, the 
Second Circuit emphasized that the definitions of remedial and removal 
actions often overlap and the statutory definitions make it difficult to 
distinguish between the two. The court follows the rule that removal actions 
deal immediately with the source of an imminent threat to public health. 
The court held that the Subsequent Owner’s responses to the pollution, such 
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as an earthen cap and a diversion ditch, were remedial rather than removal. 
The court reasoned that these actions are remedial because they were not 
designed to eliminate an immediate threat, but instead mitigate any 
potential harm caused by not containing pollutants. Further, the court 
clarifies that subsequent actions on the same land may count as separate and 
distinct remedial actions for statute of limitations purposes, correcting the 
district court’s analysis. The court held that the Subsequent Owner’s actions 
were correctly classified as remedial but are not barred by the statute of 
limitations. Further, the court found that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion to order the Original Owner to pay 95% of future remedial 
actions and remands the case for proceedings consistent with its order. 
State 
Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll, 2020 MT 198. 
Three Landowners filed six claims for adjudication of decreed water 
rights after a dispute arose from a series of property conveyances. The basis 
for these claims focused on the original decree of two historical water 
rights, which later comingled to irrigate lands now owned by all parties. 
Landowner-1 asserted ownership allocation based on the percentage of 
historical irrigation of respective lands. Alternatively, Landowner-2 
asserted ownership of both historical rights based on prior conveyance to 
their predecessor. The water court found that both historical rights became 
appurtenant to the respective lands through comingled irrigation and 
therefore each landowner, through deeded language, is entitled to a pro-rata 
share of the decreed rights on their respective properties. Additionally, the 
water court found that absent water measurement records, flow rates for the 
rights are equitably determined by the percentage of irrigated acreage on 
each property. Landowner-2 motioned for post-judgment relief claiming the 
water court over-allocated the flow rate awarded to Landowner-1 based on 
previously undisclosed expert opinion. The water court found that the 
opinion obtained by Landowner-2 did not warrant post-judgment relief, and 
denied Landowner 2’s motion. Landowner-2 appealed to the Montana 
Supreme Court, challenging (1) the water court’s method of interpreting the 
conveyances, (2) the pro-rata allocation of the decreed rights, and (3) the 
alleged misallocation of rights to Landowner 1. The court affirmed each 
decision of the water court, employing contract principles to substantiate 
the water court’s finding of clear intent from prior conveyances. Further, 
the court ruled that the water court, based on lack of record, correctly 
determined equitable flow rates and subsequent allocation thereof. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss2/28
2020]        Recent Case Decisions 343 
  
 
United States v. State of Washington, Dept. of Ecology, No. C01-0047Z, 
slip copy, 2020 WL 4756460 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 30, 2020). 
Water Master provided his annual report for 2019-2020 to the court. 
Water Master recommended that the Water User Fees (“Fees”) of both 
Tribe and Landowners be waived for 2020-2021 (agreed to by Tribe, 
Landowners, and Department). This is due to the financial hardships caused 
by the Covid-19 pandemic. Water Master provided two justifications to 
waive the Fees. First, Water Master’s account had enough funds to 
withstand one year of nonpayment of Water Fees by both Tribe and 
Landowners. This is in part because Water Master has maintained lower 
operations costs than what were expected from the original 2007 
agreement. Additionally, the interest gained from Water Master’s account 
would help cover the operating costs. Second, Water Master suggested 
waiving Fees instead of deferring because of the ongoing financial 
uncertainty of Covid-19. Specifically, it is difficult to know whether 
financial outlooks will be better when the deferred Fees would become due. 
Water Master also suggested that the Department send letters explaining the 
Fee waiver and including procedures for contacting Water Master if 
Landowners believe these recommendations were incorrect. Additionally, 
Water Master’s report included that Tribe paid its Fees for 2019-2020, but 
that Landowners underpaid, and this underpayment should be added to 
Landowner’s Fees for 2021-2022. The Department owed no payment for 
2019-2020 per the settlement agreement. The court accepted Water 
Master’s report and approved Water Master’s suggestion on August 17, 
2020. Id. No. C01-47 TSZ, slip copy, 2020 WL 4747895 
White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, ex rel. State v. Minnesota Dep’t of Nat. 
Res., 946 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 2020). 
White Bear Lake Restoration Association (“Association”) sued 
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) for declaratory and 
injunctive relief for alleged violation of the Minnesota Environmental 
Rights Act (“MERA”) and violation of public-trust doctrine stemming from 
groundwater-appropriation permits that DNR had issued that caused the 
lakes levels to fall below legal levels. The trial court found in favor of 
Association on both grounds. DNR appealed and the court of appeals 
reversed and remanded on both grounds. The Supreme Court of Minnesota 
granted review and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
The court held that the legislature that had created structures for public 
water use was to be prioritized and balanced, and because no private 
encroachment or diversion to a separate state had occurred, the common-
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law public trust doctrine need not apply. The court held that Association 
claims under MERA were merited and that they had stated claims upon 
which relief could be granted because the alleged activities by the DNR 
were covered by the “any conduct” language in the statute. Two justices 
signed a concurrence and dissent, disagreeing that the “any conduct” 
language was broad enough to provide a claim. Case remanded to appellate 
court for a decision on the remaining issues on appeal. 
Bates Energy Oil & Gas, LLC v. Complete Oil Field Servs., LLC, No. 5:17-
cv-808, 2020 WL 4677668 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2020). 
 (Note: this is largely a case of fraud and incidentally involves fracking 
sand.) 
Fracking sand supplier (“Supplier”) originally sued Purchaser over a 
contract between the parties to provide fracking sand. Purchaser removed to 
federal court and counter-sued, joining multiple parties related to Supplier 
as Counter-Defendants (“Cohorts”) and alleging an elaborate scheme by 
which the Supplier and many Cohorts jointly worked to defraud Purchaser 
of hundreds of thousands of dollars from the escrow account set up for use 
of the contracted parties. Supplier’s original suit was dismissed, and several 
defendants in the counter suit settled, defaulted, or were dropped from the 
claims, leaving the court to rule on its findings against the remaining non-
defaulting Cohorts. Purchaser’s causes of action against non-defaulting 
Cohorts addressed by the court are (1) fraud and conspiracy to commit 
fraud, (2) theft and conspiracy to commit theft, (3) breach of fiduciary duty 
and conspiracy to commit breach of fiduciary duty, (4) restitution or money 
had and received, (5) conversion, and (6) attorney’s fees. The court found 
for Purchaser on the counts of fraud, theft, and restitution, holding various 
Cohorts jointly and severally liable for the Supplier’s fraud, for their share 
of the stolen funds, and for individualized restitution depending on who 
held the money. The court found Purchaser failed to establish fiduciary duty 
or meet the elements for the tort of conversion, and the court declined to 
rule on attorney’s fees pending a motion yet to be filed. The court 
concluded by noting Texas’s one-satisfaction rule applies to this case 
despite the litany of Supplier’s and Cohorts’ bad conduct because Purchaser 
suffered only a single financial injury. 
Elk Grove Dev. Co. v. Four Corners Cty. Water & Sewer Dist., No. 19-
0599, 2020 WL 4462831 (Mont. Aug. 4, 2020). 
Subdivision Developer filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent Water 
District from using the subdivision’s water outside of the subdivision. 
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Subdivision Developer possessed several covenants for the property. One of 
the covenants gave Subdivision Developer control over the water in 
dispute. Subdivision Developer moved for summary judgment arguing 
“[t]he Covenants unambiguously restrict off-subdivision use of water.” At 
the hearing on the motion, the district court decided two issues. First, 
whether the covenant restricts the water supply to use within the 
subdivision and if the covenant precluded any change to that right. Second, 
whether the covenant was an “unreasonable restraint on alienation.” The 
district court opined that the covenant was not unreasonable as it served its 
intended purpose of protecting the subdivisions exclusive right to the water. 
The district court granted the Subdivision Developer’s motion for summary 
judgment and entered an injunction preventing the use of the subdivisions 
water for uses outside of the subdivision. Water District appealed. The 
Supreme Court reviewed the issue of whether the covenant was an 
unreasonable restraint on alienation. The court disagreed with the district 
court’s holding that the covenant was not unreasonable. The court 
acknowledged the factors that the district court considered in their decision. 
However, the court articulated that the factors do not carry as much weight 
as statutes. Moreover, under Montana law, water belongs to the people and 
should be used for public benefit. Therefore, although water may be held by 
a party, “it is not ‘owned’ in the usual sense.” Parties who hold water rights 
are to make use of the water which does not included the right to physical 
ownership. Therefore, the court held that Water District is entitled to 
summary judgment on the issue of whether the covenant was an 
unreasonable restriction on alienation. 
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Hardy v. United States, 965 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
Central of Georgia Railway Company (“CGA”) operated a rail line 
located within Landowner’s property. CGA applied with the Surface 
Transportation Board (“STB”) to abandon a portion of the rail line. 
Subsequently, the Newton County Trail Path Foundation (“NCTPF”) 
reached an agreement with STB to establish recreational trails along the 
abandoned rail line and issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU). 
Amidst negotiations, CGA mistakenly described the location of the rail line 
but an amended description was accepted by NCTPF. Landowners sued the 
United States (“Government”), alleging STB improperly approved a 
conversion of railroad rights-of-way to recreational trails under the National 
Trail Systems Act (“Trails Act”). Landowners contended that the deeds 
executed with CGA were for an easement and CGA could not convey their 
interest to NCTPF. The trial court granted summary judgment for 
Landowners, ruling that the deeds conveyed only easements. The trial court 
also found that the NITU constituted a temporary taking. On appeal, 
Government argued that the deeds conveyed a fee simple interest in CGA 
and Landowners lacked the requisite interest to allege a takings. 
Additionally, Government argued that NITU did not affect a takings 
because the erroneous description showed a lack of intent to abandon. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected 
Government’s first argument and affirmed the trial court’s finding that 
Hardy conveyed an easement. The appellate court relied upon authority 
prioritizing the intent of the parties at conveyance and held that the 
executed deeds were intended to act as a railroad right-of-way, not a fee 
simple conveyance. Additionally, the appellate court vacated the trial 
court’s finding that the NITU was a temporary taking for lack of evidence 
regarding when Railroad would have abandoned the easements and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DCP Sand Hills Pipeline, L.L.C. v. San Miguel Elec. Coop., No. 04-19-
00288-CV, 2020 WL 4607062 (Tex. App.-San Antonio August 12, 2020). 
Company 2 sued Company 1 seeking a declaration that Company 1’s 
easement was invalid, Company 2’s lignite lease was superior to the 
easement, and a permanent injunction requiring Company 1 to move its 
pipeline. Company 2 countersued that the lignite lease had expired and 
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sought to condemn the land covered by the easement. The trial court 
awarded summary judgement to Company 2, Company 1 appealed. The 
appeals court reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgement on 
the condemnation claim, but affirmed the remainder of the grant of 
summary judgement. The appeals court affirmed the validity of the lease 
because Company 2 was not seeking to establish possessory or ownership 
rights to the land and the trespass to try title statute did not apply to this 
claim. The appeals court reversed on the grounds that Company 2 had not 
shown that the land covered by the easement was already devoted to a 
public use as Company 2 had not applied for a mining permit at the time of 
the installation of the pipeline. The appeals court also held that the 
condemnation would not practically destroy or materially interfere with the 
current use as the condemnation would affect at most 14.6% of the strip 
mining potential of the land. The case was remanded for further 
proceedings on the condemnation issue. 
Other Use 
Smith v. B&G Royalties, 2020 WY 106, 2020 WL 4783125 (Wyo. 2020). 
Mineral Owner’s father owned mineral interest in a property in 
Wyoming. In 1989, Mineral Owner’s father, through a warranty deed, 
conveyed an undivided one-eighth interest to Company for all of minerals 
from what the property produced. The deed mentioned no reservation of a 
royalty interest. In 2017, Mineral Owner’s father died, and Mineral Owner 
received the remaining interest. In 2018, Mineral Owner filed for 
declaratory judgment and to quiet title to a 1.0417% royalty interest against 
Company. Company filed a counterclaim seeking quiet title and a 
declaratory judgment. Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The district court granted summary judgment for the Company. Mineral 
Owner contended that the 1989 warranty deed conveyance did not include 
the royalty interest because Mineral Owner’s father kept the interests 
unbundled, which was the intention in the conveyance. On appeal, 
Company requested attorneys’ fees and costs. The Wyoming Supreme 
Court held that the 1989 warranty deed was unambiguous and subjected to 
rules of contract interpretation. When conveying mineral interests, there 
must expressed intent. The warranty deed’s plain language clearly did not 
state a clear expression of retaining royalty interest. Due to the warranty 
deed’s language, combined with no mention of the royalty interest, the 
Mineral Owner was estopped from claiming anything less than the 
unrestricted 1/8 interest originally conveyed. Company was not entitled to 
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attorneys’ fees. Awarding of attorneys’ fees requires lack of a cogent 
argument or failure to support the claims. Mineral Owner's brief was 
sufficient to meet the requirement of a cogent argument. The court affirmed 
the lowers court’s decision and declined to award attorneys’ fees. 
Florida Rock Properties, Inc. v. Jemal’s Buzzards Point L.L.C., No. 18-
483, 2020 WL 4583523 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2020). 
Developer owns and develops real estate (Developer’s Property) adjacent 
to a former bulk fuel distribution terminal (the “Fuel Terminal Property”). 
Developer brought this suit against Former Owners of the Fuel Terminal 
Property, alleging that petroleum contamination from the Fuel Terminal 
Property had migrated onto the Developer’s Property. Former Owners 
brought indemnification and contribution claims against other companies. 
Former Owners and Other Companies moved for summary judgment on 
statute-of-limitations grounds. 
The court held that the issue is ripe for summary judgment, because fact 
discovery regarding “the statute of limitations issue” was completed. 
Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations shall not begin to toll 
until the injury is discovered or, with reasonable diligence, should have 
been discovered. The discovery rule effectively creates a duty of inquiry, 
and knowledge is deemed sufficient if the plaintiff has “reason to suspect” 
that the defendant did something wrong. The court held that Developer 
discovered or with reasonable diligence should have discovered its claims 
in February 2000 when it received the Phase II report that identified the 
Fuel Terminal Property as a likely source of the soil and groundwater 
contamination. 
However, Developer may still recover for injuries from injurious acts 
committed within the limitations period, and it is Developer’s burden to 
identify injurious action within the limitations period that caused harm. 
Summary judgment is inappropriate as the full discovery of “migration-
related issues” is not completed. So, the court granted in part and denied in 
part Former Owners’ and Other Companies’ motions for summary 
judgment. 
Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 965 F.3d 214 (3d. Cir. 2020). 
The Baptistes on behalf of a class of homeowners and renters brought 
suit against the Bethlehem Landfill Company. Due to noxious odors and 
other air contaminants coming from the landfill, the action claims 
interference with the use and enjoyment of their homes and loss and 
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property value. The action was brought under the following theories: (1) 
public nuisance, (2) private nuisance, and (3) negligence. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
dismissed the complaint on the basis that there were too many residents in 
the area similarly affected to sustain a private claim for public nuisance, the 
odors affected too many people and the landfill was too far away from them 
to constitute a private nuisance, and that the Baptistes had failed to identify 
a duty of care to maintain a negligence claim. 
The United States Court of Appeals found that the Baptistes sufficiently 
alleged a “particular damage” to sustain a private claim for public nuisance 
because they asserted their claims specifically on behalf of a class of 
homeowners and not the community at large. The Appellate Court further 
found that there existed no support under Pennsylvania law for rejecting a 
private nuisance claim on the ground that the property affected was too far 
from the alleged nuisance. Lastly, the Appellate Court reversed the District 
Court’s dismissal on the negligence claim because there is no longer any 
dispute Bethlehem had a common-law duty to operate the landfill in a 
reasonable manner that avoids unreasonable harm to the Baptiste. The 
United States Court of Appeals reversed the United States District Court for 
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Wal-Mart Stores E., LP v. State Corp. Comm’n, 844 S.E.2d 676 (Va. 2020). 
Customer appealed from a State Corporation Commission (“SCC”) order 
denying Customer’s petitions seeking SCC’s permission to aggregate the 
demand of multiple locations to qualify to buy electricity from someone 
other than the public utilities. This case involves a statute that gives SCC 
discretion to authorize retail choice to nonresidential customers who 
aggregate their demand to exceed five megawatts. 
The SCC, in its decision, focused on the question of whether granting the 
petitions would be consistent with public interest. SCC found that 
Customer’s departure would cause an increased cost to remaining public 
utility customers and could possibly lower the return for the public utility, 
which would decrease their ability to credit or refund customers. SCC 
concluded these outcomes were contrary to the public interest and denied 
Customer’s petition. 
Customer argued (1) that SCC didn’t use the term “public policy” in line 
with legislative intent, (2) the factual record was insufficient for the SCC to 
make their decision, and (3) SCC abused its discretion in denying 
Customer’s motion for reconsideration. The Virginia Supreme Court held 
that legislative intent shows that SCC has broad discretion and that they did 
not abuse it with their decision regarding public policy. The court also held 
that SCC is responsible for considering the factual record, is entitled to 
draw conclusions contrary to those Customer made, and that the burden of 
proof is not on SCC. Finally, the court held SCC did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the motion to reconsider, because Customer did not ask them to 
reconsider a prior decision. Because SCC used its broad discretion 
consistent with statutory authority, the court affirmed SCC’s order denying 
Customer’s petition. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 964 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
Petitioners, (“Utility Commissioners”) appealed a rehearing denial by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) over its passing of 
Order(s) 841 and 841-A. 841, aimed to remove barriers to utility 
distribution in the free market regarding electric storage technologies 
(ESR), such as batteries. 841-A, prevented state and local authorities from 
“broadly prohibit[ing] all retail customers from participating in RTO/ISO 
markets”. 
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The court began by establishing that the Utility Commissioners had 
standing and that the issue was ripe for appeal. Regarding Utility 
Commissioners’ claim that FERC exceeded its jurisdiction with 841, the 
court made a three-part evaluation. First, did the prohibition “directly 
affect[ ] wholesale rates?” Next, did FERC regulate state regulated 
facilities? Lastly, the court must ensure that its determination does not 
conflict with the APA’s “core purpose[ ]” of “curb[ing] prices and 
enhance[ing] reliability in the wholesale electric market.” 
The court determined that 841 does affect wholesale rates by opening up 
the market to ESRs. The court held that 841 does not directly regulate 
distribution systems which are under state jurisdiction, therefore, 841 does 
not infringe on the rights guaranteed to states under the Federal Power Act 
(FPA). However, through the Supremacy Clause, it is under FERC’s 
jurisdiction to determine who participates in the wholesale markets. This 
leaves states with the same authority they possessed prior to 841’s passing. 
Finally, the decision did not foreclose judicial review should a conflict 
arise between states and FERC. Next the court held that by passing 841, 
FERC, was in accordance with law and it was not an abuse of its authority 
due to the level of detail and issue awareness surrounding the passage of 
841. The court held that Utility Commissioners failed to show that Order 
841 and 841-A are not in compliance with the FPA’s bifurcation of state 
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TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS 
Corporations 
Keane Frac, LP, v. SP Silica Sales, LLC, No. 01-19-00847-CV, 2020 WL 
4589751 (Tex. App. Aug. 11, 2020). 
Note – This case seems to be procedural in nature. While it deals with 
two companies regarding an alleged breach of contract for the purchase of 
fracking sand it deals more on the application of an already settled question. 
During the initial filing, the statutory interpretation of the Texas Citizens 
Participation Act was quite broad and there were various splits amongst 
appellate courts in Texas. However, prior to this case being settled the 
Texas Supreme Court held on an extremely similar case in Creative Oil & 
Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC. The court in that case found that a 
certain phrase within the TCPA should be interpreted in a certain manner. 
In this case, the appellate court is just applying the already established case 
law of the Texas Supreme Court. While the Creative case dealt with a 
singular well and this case handles fracking sand the section of the statute 
in question is still the same. Summary Below 
Completer appealed the decision of the lower court to deny their motion 
to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (The “Act”), alleging 
that their contract was related to their right of free speech about a matter of 
public concern regarding goods in the marketplace. In the lower court, 
Producer sued Completer alleging breach of contract, fraud, and fraudulent 
inducement. Producer and Completer were previously in an agreement that 
provided for Producer to supply Completer with a certain tonnage of 
fracking sand monthly. The original agreement provided a credit system if 
Producer failed to provide all the ordered sand from a certain plant that was 
under construction but would be finished before the contract’s beginning. 
Contract also provided a right of termination for Completer if Producer 
failed to produce a certain amount on three separate occasions. Through the 
first three months, the plant was not operational, and Completer had to 
purchase the sand on a “spot market” rate with Producer providing the 
difference in cost. The two companies then entered into a separate contract 
to control their interactions due to Producer’s failures, altering the 
agreement between the two. Completer later gave notice of termination and 
Producer sued alleging the above. Completer moved to dismiss under the 
Act. The trial court held that the act did not apply and the dismissal was 
frivolous, awarding costs and fees to Producer. The appeals court found that 
the Act did not apply, since the communications were only between the two 
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parties and had no impact on outside groups. The court relied on established 
caselaw regarding the interpretation of “in the marketplace” to arrive at this 
outcome. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss but 
overturned the award of costs and fees. 
Patents / Intellectual Property 
Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., No. 17-1555, No. 
17-1626, 2020 WL 4743511 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 17, 2020). 
Appellant (“Bennett Regulator”) appealed to the Federal Circuit 
following the loss of multiple claims in a patent dispute before the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board as well as the “adequacy” of the board’s sanctions 
award against Appellee (“Atlanta Gas”) for failure to terminate its inter 
partes review decision. Atlanta Gas cross-appealed to overturn the sanctions 
award. 
First, Bennett Regulator’s challenged the narrowness of the board’s 
scope regarding four terms used within the claim. On each of the terms, the 
court determined that there was a lack of intrinsic evidence in the record to 
support appellant’s view and they were under no obligation to allow in 
appellant’s extrinsic evidence, therefore upholding the Appeal Board’s 
decision on this issue. 
The second challenge accused the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of 
violating the Administrative Procedures Act which was based upon the 
Board’s duty to “make the necessary findings and have an adequate 
‘evidentiary basis for its findings.’” The court determined that the Board 
adequately examined the patent’s claim and held that its wording 
purportedly conflicted with the testimony provided by Bennett Regulator. 
Lastly, the court held that the award of sanctions against Atlanta Gas for 
abuse of discretion in failing to provide adequate notice over issues 
surrounding a merger/acquisition was outside of the court’s jurisdiction. 
This was based on the sanctions order not being a final judgement by the 
Board for lack of an award amount. Furthermore, the court declined to 
exercise pendent jurisdiction in the sanctions award matter. The court 
affirmed the Appeal Board’s’ finding that the patent was unpatentable and 
remanded the case back to the Board to quantify the sanctions awarded in 
light of the court’s opinion. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
therefore, state (or federal) court rules should be consulted before citing the 
case as precedent. 
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Northern Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. US Dep’t of the Interior, 965 F.3d 705 (9th 
Cir. 2020). 
Environmental Center sued the US Department of the Interior 
(Department) after Department failed to conduct a new NEPA report prior 
to the 2017 lease sale, violating its own regulations. In 2012, Department 
conducted an environmental impact statement (EIS) and claimed that was 
sufficient to satisfy NEPA for this sale. The district court granted summary 
judgment to the Department in full. Environmental Center appealed, 
claiming the EIS was inadequate for the 2017 lease sale. The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court in full, holding the 2012 EIS to include the 2017 
sale. The court held that nothing in their case law prevented a 
programmatic-level EIS from also serving as a site-specific analysis needed 
for NEPA, and cited several examples of that actually being expressly 
allowed. In this case, the court held that the type of analysis used in the 
2012 EIS may qualify given the right factual circumstances. The court 
rejected both an approach that solely looked at the NEPA adequacy to 
decide if an action separated by time from the initial EIS because it makes 
the statute of limitations meaningless in certain situations and an approach 
that looks at deviation from the underlying plan or program because the 
tiering regulations assume that site-specific studies would also be 
conducted. Rather, the court held that the initial EIS ought to be examined 
to see if it purported to be the EIS for a subsequent action because it 
provides insight into what the agency was planning to do as a result of the 
EIS. NEPA regulations require EISs to carefully define the proposals under 
consideration. In this case, the defined scope of the study was nebulous but 
the court found it reasonable that it considered future lease sales and 
questions of its adequacy for that purpose were time barred. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 18-CV-4596 
(VEC), 2020 WL 4605235 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2020). 
Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) sued U.S. Department of 
Interior (“DOI”) after DOI issued a memorandum fundamentally altering 
the agency’s interpretation of “takings” and “killings” under the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (“MTBA”). This policy shift eliminated any legal 
consequence for incidental “takings” and “killings” reversing almost five 
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decades policy interpretation by DOI. NRDC sued to vacate the 
memorandum and the guidance given in reliance on the memorandum. 
NRDC argued that DOI interpretation of the MTBA was in violation of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). NRDC moved for summary 
judgement and DOI cross-moved. The court granted NDRC motion for 
summary judgement and subsequently denied DOI cross motion for several 
reasons. First, DOI’s memorandum read into the MTBA a “mens rea” 
component that does not exist in the act. Second, DOI should not be given 
deference because the memorandum was “a recent and sudden departure 
from long-held agency positions”, as well as “an informal pronouncement 
lacking notice-and-comment” and, that there “is no evidence of input from 
the agency actually tasked with implementing the statute.” Third, that 
legislative history did not indicate congress intended for the MTBA to be 
read so narrowly. Finally, the court found that the memorandum violated 
the APA and that vacatur was necessary. Memorandum Vacated and 
remanded to DOI for further proceedings. 
New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 964 F.3d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
New York petitioned EPA to find that power-generating and other 
facilities in nine different States violated the Good Neighbor Provision  
(“GNP”) by producing emissions that significantly contributed to New 
York’s difficulty attaining or maintaining compliance with the 2008 and 
2015 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone. EPA denied the 
petition because it failed to meet the standard for establishing a violation of 
the GNP. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that 
EPA’s reasons for rejecting New York’s petition were arbitrary and 
capricious in two ways. First, EPA did not give a good reason as to why 
New York’s petition failed, and their test demanded an impossible showing 
from New York, requiring a detailed comparison of all known and 
unknown pollution sources. 
Second, EPA incorrectly interpreted the Clean Air Act by evaluating 
downwind air quality at a time past the statutory deadline, when it should 
be evaluated at that deadline. EPA also incorrectly tried to say that states 
can only challenge interstate transport of pollution within their geographical 
borders, when New York should be able to challenge since they are part of 
a multistate nonattainment area. The circuit court vacated and remanded 
EPA’s decision for further proceedings. 
 
  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
356 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 6 
  
 
POET Biorefining, LLC v. EPA, No. 19-1139, 2020 WL 4745274 (D.C. Cir. 
Aug. 14, 2020). 
Cellulosic Biofuel Producer (“Producer”) petitioned for review of EPA’s 
guidance on the measuring methods for cellulosic biofuel as regulated by 
EPA’s Pathways II Rule. Pathways II Rule requires certification of 
cellulosic biofuel by either, the voluntary consensus standard body 
(“VCSB”) method or a peer-review method. Cellulosic biofuel is a 
renewable fuel promoted by the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard 
program. Following EPA’s implementation of Pathways II Rule, biofuel 
producers’ measurements indicated significant variation, so EPA issued 
guidance to help explain the requirements for certification. 
Producer registered for cellulosic-biofuel Renewable Identification 
Numbers using measurements certified by the peer-review method; but 
EPA denied Producer’s request because Producer did not “reasonably 
approximat[e] the amount of cellulose that is actually being converted into 
fuel.” Producer argued EPA’s guidance lacked proper notice and comment, 
imposed arbitrary requirements that could not be met, and disregarded the 
Pathways II Rule. As there are two methods to achieve cellulosic biofuel 
certification, by VCSB or peer-review, the D.C. Circuit Appellate Court 
evaluated each method separately. 
First, the court dismissed, for lack of ripeness, the discussion of VCSB-
certified method because no method exists. Second, the court held the peer-
review method was ripe for review 
because EPA denied Producer’s registration that utilized the peer-review 
method. Third, the court established jurisdiction, under the Clean Air Act, 
because EPA’s peer-review guidance reflects a settled agency stance. 
Fourth, the court held EPA’s guidance is interpretive because EPA further 
explained an existing rule, the Pathways II Rule, and its requirements for 
certification. Therefore, the guidance did not require notice or comment. 
Fifth, EPA’s guidance was reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious, and in 
accordance with the Pathways II Rule because it demonstrates how biofuel 
producers obtain accurate results through the peer-review method. The 
court dismissed the petition in part and denied in part. 
Clean Wisconsin v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 964 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
Public health and environmental organizations, municipal governments, 
and State of Illinois petitioned for review of area attainment designations 
promulgated under Clean Air Act (CAA) by Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) for National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
involving control for ozone. 
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For jurisdiction, the court held both environmental petitions and 
governmental petitions have Article III standing, because environmental 
harms that constitute cognizable injuries including: (1) reduced aesthetic 
and recreational values of the area; (2) adverse health effects of asserting 
realistic health concerns; (3) the health and economic costs of increased 
pollution. 
On the merits, as EPA has (1) treated similarly-situated areas differently, 
(2) drawn conflicting conclusions from the same data, (3) had 
inconsistencies in the record and conflicting characterizations of data, and 
(4) centrally relied on one apparently mistaken interpretation of data, the 
court held that alleged EPA’s designations, except designation of Lake 
County, are arbitrary and capricious. The court held the EPA must provide 
further explanation showing how the evidence supports its attainment 
designation or make a different designation if it concludes on re-
examination that the evidence so requires. The court denied EPA’s request 
for voluntary remand because the permission of voluntary remand will 
violate the Clean Air Act’s statutory deadline. 
As there is a possibility that EPA will be able to substantiate the relevant 
designations on remand, the court remanded the unlawful attainment 
designations to EPA, instead of vacating them. 
R.L. Vallee, Inc. v. Vt. Agency of Transportation, No. 5:18-CV-104, 2020 
WL 4689788, (D. Vt. July 8, 2020). 
Three entities (collectively “Companies”) sued Vermont Agency of 
Transportation (“VTrans”) and Federal Highway Agency (“FHWA”) 
challenging FHWA’s approval of VTrans’s highway redesign project 
(“Project”). Companies claimed VTrans failed to prepare an environmental 
impact statement before approval. VTrans and FHWA claimed an 
environmental impact statement was unnecessary because the proposed 
Project qualified for a categorical exclusion (“CE”). Both parties moved for 
summary judgment. In support of their motion, Companies argued Project 
did not qualify for CE and VTrans failed to include a nearby store’s permit 
application to build a gas station in its assessment of foreseeable impacts. 
The court considered each argument to determine if FHWA’s approval of 
Project was arbitrary or capricious. The court found FHWA’s approval to 
be reasonable based on: (1) Project’s impact on traffic flow is to be 
minimal, (2) revisions to regulations did not apply during approval because 
only regulations in effect apply at time of decision, (3) language in 
VTrans’s application effectively met the requirement of ensuring no 
significant environmental effects will result, and (4) highway improvements 
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to improve safety and traffic flow were not automatically ineligible for CE. 
The court also found the store’s application to build a gas station was not a 
foreseeable impact because Project was not a cause of store’s application 
being approved, but a condition precedent. The court denied companies’ 
motion for summary judgement and granted VTrans’s and FHWA’s motion 
for summary judgment, overall finding FHWA’s approval was not arbitrary 
or capricious. 
State 
Crouzet v. First Baptist Church of Stonington, 199 Conn. App. 532, 2020 
WL 4743006 (Conn. App. Ct. Aug. 18, 2020). 
Crouzet brought this action to recover damages for environmental 
contamination of certain real property against the First Baptist Church of 
Stonington. Crouzet is alleging (1) the ongoing contamination of the his 
soil, and the basement of his property, (2) liability pursuant to Connecticut 
General Statute 22a-16, (3) trespass, (4) private nuisance, (5) liability under 
Connecticut General Statute 22a-451, and (6) breach of contract. The trial 
court ruled in favor of the First Baptist Church of Stonington and the 
question on appeal was whether the trial court’s factual findings that the 
Church’s had shown the secondary contamination is clearly erroneous in 
light of expert testimony and the factual bases for such testimony. 
The Appellate Court found that the only expert presented who had the 
opinion that there was the possibility of a secondary source of 
contamination was based on speculation. The Court proceeded to rule the 
expert’s opinion as a non-supportive conclusion of a secondary source. 
Further, the Court found that even if there was some evidentiary basis for 
the secondary contamination, the findings do not support the conclusion 
that Crouzet failed to prove the Church caused the contamination beneath 
his house. The Court noted that the existence of a secondary source of 
contamination did not mean that Crouzet failed to provide evidence that the 
Church could be a source of contamination, but that it might impact the 
damages to which he may be awarded. 
Finally, the Appellate Court found that the trial court’s finding that the 
Church proved a secondary source of the pollution in Crouzet’s basement 
has no bearing regarding the pollution that continues to exist outside of his 
basement. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court improperly 
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S. D. Petroleum Release Compensation Fund v. BP plc, 2020 SD 47, 2020 
WL 4689455. 
South Dakota Petroleum Release Compensation Fund (“FUND”) sought 
recovery payments from Energy Company for costs associated with 
cleaning up environmental contamination from underground petroleum 
storage tanks (“UST”). FUND also sought to recover payments made to 
third parties for cleanup costs of Energy Company’s other USTs. FUND 
alleged theories of (1) misrepresentation, (2) subrogation rights, (3) unjust 
enrichment, (4) fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation, (5) fraud, 
(6) strict liability, and (7) recovery of litigation costs. The circuit court 
granted Energy Company’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. 
FUND appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the 
circuit court’s decision. First, FUND failed to prove Energy Company had a 
right of recovery for cleanup costs from its insurers. FUND identified no 
policy indemnifying Energy Company for cleanup costs or covering 
cleanup costs at the UST sites at issue, therefore, FUND cannot recover 
payments based on fraud, unjust enrichment, or misrepresentation if it 
cannot establish damages. Second, all but one of the third-party payment 
claims were time barred by statute. FUND failed on the remaining third-
party payment claim to establish Energy Company was responsible for 
cleanup costs. At the time of contamination, Energy Company did not own 
the UST site at issue and a federal agency determined Energy Company 
was not the responsible party for cleanup costs at said UST site. Therefore, 
Energy Company was not strictly liable for the cleanup of UST sites. Last, 
because FUND failed to recover on any of its claims, FUND could not 
recover litigation costs. The court affirmed circuit court’s order of summary 
judgment for Energy Company. 
2627 LLC v. The Valley’s Plan. Council, Inc., No. 1838, 2020 WL 4673887 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 12, 2020). 
(This case is likely procedural.) 
Conservationists resisted Developer’s plan to build four homes in a 
historic district Conservationists argued that Developer’s plan was like a 
denied plan in 2004 (not associated with Developer). The administrative 
law judge (“judge”) approved the plan, finding that res judicata did not 
apply because the two plans were sufficiently different. Additionally, judge 
found that he was legally unable to rule on the project’s impact on the 
historic district. The Board of Appeals approved the project, but the Circuit 
Court denied the application solely for collateral estoppel. Developer 
appealed. The court faced four issues. First, Developer’s plan was not 
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barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because the plan was 
sufficiently distinct from the 2004 plan. Specifically, Developer’s plan 
featured fewer houses on less land, included a different portion of the 
historic district and did not include the historic building, and the houses 
would be built on a less severe grade. Second, the judge improperly 
dismissed his ability to determine if Developer’s plan would affect the 
historic district. The law still requires judges to determine potential impact 
even after some statutory protections were removed. Third, the judge made 
a reasonable determination of the stormwater management system’s 
effectiveness based on the parties’ expert witness. Fourth and finally, the 
judge improperly accepted the county’s prima facie approval of the 
panhandle lots. Conservationists provided evidence and witnesses to 
question the lot’s ability to meet all requirements; therefore, the county or 
Developer should have presented evidence on the lot’s adequacy before 
they were approved. The circuit court’s holding on collateral estoppel was 
vacated, and the case was remanded to determine the impact on the historic 
district & the adequacy of the panhandle plots. This case is an unpublished 
opinion, therefore state or federal rules should be consulted before citing it 
as precedent. 
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